Yesterday I saw the first of two talks given by Michael Hardt at the Humanities Institute at Stony Brook University. Hardt is an associate Professor of Literature and Romance Studies at Duke Univ., and is the co-author (with Antonio Negri) of has published Empire (Harvard, 2000) and the forthcoming Multitude (Penguin, Sept. 2004).
The series is entitles War and Democracy in the Age of Empire. He argues the nature of war has changed in recent years.
1. Whereas previously wars were usually waged between sovereign states, the present state of war is that of a global civil war, within a global empire. Instances of war have their local aspects, but largely wars contain of element of war against empire.
2. Whereas previously was was seen as an exception to be used when politics was exhausted, we are now in a global state of of exception, with the USA - having an exceptional role - in driving the permanent war which replaces regular politics as a means of negotiation.
3. The present war against an abstract enemy is equivalent to police activity, used in time of omnicrisis. It is boundless in spatial range and and time.
4. The arguments used to legimitize violence have changed, and states have a declining ability to legimitize it. He gave the example of Gulf War I (justified by the breech to international law after the invasion of the sovereign state of Kuwait), then the NATO intervention in Kosovo (an intervention against a sovereign state justified on moral grounds, to avoid ethnic cleansing), and finally the present Gulf War II. Contrary to the prior two examples, where a priori reasoning was used, preventive war uses a posteriori arguments, 'violence' is justified retrospectively if it can bring order. This is a more tenuous form of legitimation. [Illustrated particularly well with Iraq, where it is still to be demonstrated whether security has been increased.]
5. War has become the foundation of politics (e.g., nation building). It has been reduced to police action (albeit at a global scale), while retaining its ability of waging mass destruction and individualized torture. He refers to this as Biopower.
6. Democracy is threatened by this change to a permanent state of exception, of suspension of the rule of law by a state of emergency - a practice accepted previously when state of emergency was understood to be brief. But the change in the character of was is cause and consquence of a failure of democracy and loss of the concept of democracy. The crisis in democracy allows the state of permanent war to continue. He gave as examples of this crisis the 2000 presidential election (I have to find time to summarize the excellend documentary Unprecedented) and the Norwegian Study of Power and Democracy that describes a decay in democracy even in Norway. What's new, that adds to a older trend of breakdown in democracy, are the effects of globalization on democratic representaion and functioning. Quite possibly the mechanisms of democracy that were developed for states are not appropriate at the global scale. At a time when state democracies are in crisis, we find ourselves needing and lacking a concept of global democracy. Most of the discussion about global democracy centers on the reform of global institutions, e.g., WTO and IMF, revolves around the issues of transparency, accountability and governance. But this illustrates how we don't know what global democracy means, or what democracy in itself means. Transparency is great, but it is not a sufficient condition for democracy. In fact, tyrannies may be transparent. And the question of accountability, raises the question of accountability to whom. Reform proponents, such as Stiglitz, answer: accountability to expert economists. They're really talking about efficiency and stability.
How would one organize a form of representation on a global scale? How would one vote for a global president, or WTO? An optimistic note: there were also strong doubts that democracy could be expanded from the scale of a city-state to a nation-state. Its not an insoluble problem.
Listen to the talk [note - the recording is not great and last over an hour]
The series is entitles War and Democracy in the Age of Empire. He argues the nature of war has changed in recent years.
1. Whereas previously wars were usually waged between sovereign states, the present state of war is that of a global civil war, within a global empire. Instances of war have their local aspects, but largely wars contain of element of war against empire.
2. Whereas previously was was seen as an exception to be used when politics was exhausted, we are now in a global state of of exception, with the USA - having an exceptional role - in driving the permanent war which replaces regular politics as a means of negotiation.
3. The present war against an abstract enemy is equivalent to police activity, used in time of omnicrisis. It is boundless in spatial range and and time.
4. The arguments used to legimitize violence have changed, and states have a declining ability to legimitize it. He gave the example of Gulf War I (justified by the breech to international law after the invasion of the sovereign state of Kuwait), then the NATO intervention in Kosovo (an intervention against a sovereign state justified on moral grounds, to avoid ethnic cleansing), and finally the present Gulf War II. Contrary to the prior two examples, where a priori reasoning was used, preventive war uses a posteriori arguments, 'violence' is justified retrospectively if it can bring order. This is a more tenuous form of legitimation. [Illustrated particularly well with Iraq, where it is still to be demonstrated whether security has been increased.]
5. War has become the foundation of politics (e.g., nation building). It has been reduced to police action (albeit at a global scale), while retaining its ability of waging mass destruction and individualized torture. He refers to this as Biopower.
6. Democracy is threatened by this change to a permanent state of exception, of suspension of the rule of law by a state of emergency - a practice accepted previously when state of emergency was understood to be brief. But the change in the character of was is cause and consquence of a failure of democracy and loss of the concept of democracy. The crisis in democracy allows the state of permanent war to continue. He gave as examples of this crisis the 2000 presidential election (I have to find time to summarize the excellend documentary Unprecedented) and the Norwegian Study of Power and Democracy that describes a decay in democracy even in Norway. What's new, that adds to a older trend of breakdown in democracy, are the effects of globalization on democratic representaion and functioning. Quite possibly the mechanisms of democracy that were developed for states are not appropriate at the global scale. At a time when state democracies are in crisis, we find ourselves needing and lacking a concept of global democracy. Most of the discussion about global democracy centers on the reform of global institutions, e.g., WTO and IMF, revolves around the issues of transparency, accountability and governance. But this illustrates how we don't know what global democracy means, or what democracy in itself means. Transparency is great, but it is not a sufficient condition for democracy. In fact, tyrannies may be transparent. And the question of accountability, raises the question of accountability to whom. Reform proponents, such as Stiglitz, answer: accountability to expert economists. They're really talking about efficiency and stability.
How would one organize a form of representation on a global scale? How would one vote for a global president, or WTO? An optimistic note: there were also strong doubts that democracy could be expanded from the scale of a city-state to a nation-state. Its not an insoluble problem.
Listen to the talk [note - the recording is not great and last over an hour]
posted by André Levy @ 8:19 AM
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